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SURVEY ARTICLES

Administrative Law
by J. Michael Davis*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals faced a number of Administrative Law issues in 1992, providing important decisions in the fields of immigration law and occupational safety. The decisions as a whole did not
depart from standard principles of Administrative Law, however, the decisions did provide substantial refinements of those principles. The most
compelling decision occurred in the field of immigration law and was the
only decision to involve a dissenting opinion.
II.

PRECLUSION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

In the election year of 1992, the Eleventh Circuit was involved in one of
the most political issues of that year, the migration of Haitian refugees
and the interdiction and return of those Haitians by the United States
*
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Government. In HaitianRefugee Center, Inc. v. Baker,' the Haitian Refugee Center ("the Center") challenged the efforts of the United States
Government, acting through the Coast Guard, to interdict and return
Haitian refugees to Haiti.2 The interdiction program, which began in September 1981, was discontinued for a short period of time following the
overthrow of the President of Haiti on September 30, 1991.8 However, the
government reinstituted the program on November 18, 1991, and on November 19, 1991, the Center filed a motion for declaratory and injunctive
relief in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida.' The district court granted the motion for a preliminary injunction on several
grounds, but found that the Center's claim based upon the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") did not have a substantial likelihood of success.' The district court specifically found that the actions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") had been committed to
Agency discretion and could not be reviewed under the APA.
The Government appealed the district court's order to the Eleventh
Circuit where the injunction was resolved and the case remanded to the
district court.7 The district court then issued a second temporary restraining order finding that the Center had established that there was a
substantial likelihood that it would prevail on the claims made under the
APA.' Subsequently, the Government appealed that order to the Eleventh Circuit.'
Among other claims, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of
whether the Center's claims under the Immigration and Nationality Act
were reviewable under the APA. 0 The court first considered whether review under the APA had been precluded by the Immigration and Nationality Act itself." The court reviewed the applicable statutes to determine
if Congress had precluded judicial review of the Agency's decision.2 After
reviewing the above sections, the court found that:
The extensive procedures set out in section 1252(b) and procedures for
judicial review provided for pursuant to section 1105(a), along with the

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1502-03.
Id. at 1502.
Id. at 1502-03.
Id. at 1503.
Id. at 1504.
Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109 (11th Cir. 1991).

8. 953 F.2d at 1504.
9. Id. at 1504-05.
10. Id. at 1505.
11. Id. at 1505-06.
12. Id. at 1506; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a), 1251-52(b), 1253(h) (1988).
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absence of procedures for judicial review provided in section 1157,
demonstrate a congressional intent to preclude judicial review at the behest of aliens beyond the borders of the United States. "'
The court buttressed this decision by citing to five prior decisions of both
circuit courts and the United States Supreme Court. 1' The court found,
based. upon its review of both statutory and case law, that it was clear
that the Immigration and Nationality Act did not provide for judicial review under the terms of the APA and therefore that review was
precluded.1 5
The court also found that review under the APA was also precluded
because the decision to repatriate the Haitians was a decision that had
been committed to Agency discretion and that this discretion was so
broad that it provided no law for the courts to apply when reviewing that
Agency action. 16 The court again reviewed the statutory provisions in
question and determined that repatriating the Haitians was, in fact, committed completely to Agency discretion.1 7 However, the Center maintained that while the decision was at the Agency's discretion, the Agency
was not following proper procedures to determine which Haitians should
be repatriated. ' The court, however, relying upon Greenwood Utilities
Commission v. Hodel " and Florida Department of Business Regulation
0
found no actual guidelines
v. United States Department of the Interior,"
for the Immigration and Naturalization Service to follow in making its
determinations as to which Haitians to repatriate and thus there were no
meaningful standards for the court to review under the APA.21 Therefore,
the court found that it could not review the Center's allegations under
the APA. 2 The court supported its decision by referring to two United
States Supreme Court cases, Marcello v. Bonds2 3 and Ardestani v. Immigration & Naturalization Service.2 In Ardestani the Court found that

13. 953 F.2d at 1506.
14. Id. at 1506-07 (citing Brownell v. We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956); Braude v. Wirtz,
350 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1965); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537
(1950); Cobb v. Murrell, 386 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1967); Li Hing of Hong Kong, Inc. v. Levin,
800 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1986)).
15. Id. at 1507.
16. Id. at 1507-08.
17. Id. at 1508.
18. Id.
19. 764 F.2d 1459 (11th Cir. 1985).
20. 768 F.2d 1248 (11th Cir. 1985).
21. 953 F.2d at 1508.
22. Id. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1988).
23. 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
24. 112 S. Ct. 515 (1991).
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the Immigration and Nationality Act was specifically designed to provide
that decisions made under the Act were not reviewable under the APA. 2
Judge Hatchet dissented.2' He believed that the Immigration and Nationality Act did not specifically preclude judicial review under the
APA.2 7 In so holding, Judge Hatchet reviewed not just the single Act but
the entire "scheme of the United States's laws relating to the interdiction
of Haitians on the high seas."" Judge Hatchet also disagreed with the
majority's decision that the decision concerning repatriation was one
which could not be reviewed under the APA as there were no meaningful
guidelines for reviewing the Agency's exercise of its discretionary authority." Judge Hatchet believed that the INS Guidelines were the appropriate authority and established standards that the court could use to evaluate the Agency's decisions.30
III.

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

In another important decision, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed regula-"
tions proposed by the Occupation Safety and Health Administration
("OSHA") concerning workplace safety and exposure to certain toxic
chemicals in the air. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 197031
requires OSHA to establish permissible exposure limits for certain air
contaminants. In 1989, OSHA issued a set of permissible exposure limits
for approximately 428 toxic substances. 3 2 In AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 33 the
AFL-CIO and various industrial groups or associations challenged these
standards. 4 The court, operating under the substantial evidence standard
of review, found in the Occupational Safety and Health Act, rejected
35
OSHA's rule.
Under the Act, OSHA is required and limited to regulating those workplace practices or substances which present a significant risk of material
health impairment.36 The court agreed that the toxic substances cited in
the rulemaking constituted a material impairment; however, the court did
25. Id. at 518-19.
26. 953 F.2d at 1515 (Hatchet, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 1521-22.
28.

Id. at 1523.

29. Id.
30. Id. at 1523-24.
31. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1988).
32. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000 (1992).
33. 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992).
34. Id. at 969.
35. Id. at 969-70; see 29 U.S.C. § 655(f).
36. 965 F.2d at 973 (citing Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607, 641-42 (1980)).
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not believe that substantial evidence existed to support the Agency's determination that these toxic substances constituted a significant risk at
the levels proposed in the rulemaking.3 7 The court was concerned that the
Agency had attempted to regulate 428 of the toxic substances in a "generic" rulemaking without providing the necessary supporting documentation or information to explain how, and in what manner, each of the
individual substances posed a significant risk." The court went to great
lengths to determine whether a reasonable and substantial basis existed
for the standards set by OSHA and concluded that the Agency had not
appropriately supported its decision.3 To the contrary, the court found
that OSHA had failed adequately to review or even compile information
necessary to review the proper exposure levels for the toxic chemicals or
whether the technology existed effectively to control the release of those
chemicals in the workplace.40 In this era of concern about the environment and workplace safety, this decision is important because it firmly
establishes that the courts will review agency action under a very exacting
standard and will not allow an agency to circumvent its responsibilities
nor short cut the administrative procedures based upon the size of that
responsibility. Indeed, the court stated that:
We have no doubt that the agency acted with the best of intentions. It
may well be, as OSHA claims, that this was the only practical way of
accomplishing a much needed revision of the existing standards and of
making major strides towards improving worker health and safety. Given
OSHA's history of slow progress in issuing standards, we can easily believe OSHA's claim that going through detailed analysis for each of the
428 different substances regulated was not possible given the time constraints set by the agency for this rulemaking. Unfortunately, OSHA's
approach to this
rulemaking is not consistent with the requirements of
41
the OSH Act.

IV. ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
Hussion v. Madigan' concerned Farmers Home Administration's
("FmHA") change in regulations concerning lease terminations and evictions from FmHA financed housing. Unlike the decision in AFL-CIO v.
OSHA, the court reviewed the rulemaking in question under the arbitrary
and capricious standard of the APA. 43 This case represented a challenge
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 975.
Id. at 975-76.
Id. at 977-82.
Id.
Id. at 987.
950 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1550.
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to an attempt by the FmHA4 to streamline the review procedures for lease
terminations and evictions.
FmHA had changed its regulations regarding administrative review of
lease evictions to provide that lease terminations could only take place if
they were based upon a material violation of the lease and the eviction
could only take place if it was pursuant to a judicial action under state or
local law." Tenants affected by the regulations filed suit and the district
court held that the regulations were arbitrary and capricious because the
FmHA had not considered, or had ignored, comments regarding a potential situation in which state's laws would not be adequate to protect a
tenant's right in the case of an eviction."0 The court based its finding
upon the conclusion that these comments had been presented to the
FmHA during the comment period; however, the final rule did not appear
to take these matters into consideration. 7 The Eleventh Circuit reviewed
the reasoning provided by the FmHA for both the proposed regulation
and the regulation as adopted, and disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the FmHA had acted arbitrarily and capriciously." s In so

holding, the circuit court found that the Agency had cited sufficient information to support a need to amend the regulations to streamline the process, and had weighed the impact of that streamlining. 49 The court, giving
deference to the Agency, found that:
As the agency has "suppl[ied] a reasoned analysis" supporting the elimination of duplicative aspects of the process, neither this court nor the
district court is authorized to "substitute its judgment for that of the
agency" merely because evidence exists which conflicts with the agency's
ultimate determination."
This distinction highlights the difference between a review based upon
substantial evidence and a review under the arbitrary and capricious
standard. In Hussion the court found that while there was a basis to challenge the Agency's decision making, as long as the Agency's decision was
supported in some manner and was not in conflict with the statute under
which the Agency was operating, the Agency's decision would be afforded
deference and affirmed. 1 However, under the substantial evidence test
44.

Id. at 1548.

45.

Id. at 1549-50.

46. Id. at 1550.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1552-54.
49. Id. at 1554.
50. Id. (citations omitted) (citing Lloyd Noland Hosp. & Clinic v. Heckler, 762 F.2d
1561, 1567 (l1th Cir. 1985) and Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
51. Id. at 1551-52.
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established in AFL-CIO v. OSHA, the Agency is not afforded such deference but is required to support its action and, in effect, to reply to all
reasonable challenges to the proposed action.
V.

DEFERENCE TO AGENCY INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE

In two cases involving the interpretation of statutes, RJR Nabisco, Inc.
v. United States"3 and Habersham Mills v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission," the court ruled in favor of the agency, relying upon the
doctrine of giving deference to an agency's interpretation of its statute,
provided such interpretation is reasonable." In RJR Nabisco, Nabisco
disputed any liability for interest accrued on certain tax liabilities.5 5 Specifically, Nabisco was concerned that the interest on the tax would not be
considered simple interest, which would cease to run upon payment of
the underlying debt, but rather the interest would accrue and compound
until payment of not only the underlying tax assessment but the applicable interest as well.1 Under the prior law, Nabisco's payment of the underlying taxes would cease the running of interest."' However, the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 required that interest be
compounded and that the compounding of interest would begin on December 31, 1982." Nabisco had paid its underlying tax liability prior to
the December 31, 1982 deadline; however, Nabisco had not paid interest
for the underlying tax by that date. The Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") viewed the interest as an outstanding debt upon which interest
could be compounded after December 31, 1982 while Nabisco argued that
it no longer owed a debt that could be compounded."
The court, after reviewing the statute, found that the IRS's interpretation of the statute was reasonable in view of the legislative history and
the wording of the statute."0 The court further indicated that this deference to agency interpretation was even more critical in the area of tax
laws thus indicating that it would take a higher showing to overturn the
interpretation than Nabisco had made.01
52.
53.
54.

955 F.2d 1457 (11th Cir 1992).
976 F.2d 1381 (11th Cir. 1992).
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837

,(1984).
55. 955 F.2d at 1458-59 (11th Cir. 1992).
56. Id. at 1459; see also Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 § 344, Pub. L.
No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324, 635 (1982).
57. 955 F.2d at 1460.
58. Id.

59. Id. at 1465.
60. Id. at 1464-65.
61. Id. at 1464.
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In Habersham Mills, the court again deferred to the Agency regarding
interpretation of its own statutes. At issue in the case was whether two

small hydropower dams used by Habersham Mills were subject to regulation by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC")." The
court conducted a rather extensive analysis of FERC's basis for extending
its jurisdiction to the two hydropower projects and found that the
Agency's interpretation of its jurisdictional mandate was entitled to deference and thus the decision should be affirmed.3
VI.

FAILURE TO EXHAUST-

The court, in Ferryv. Hayden,64 Mullen-Cofee v. Immigration & Naturalization Service," and Kobleur v. Group Hospitalization & Medical
Services, Inc." faced the issue of exhaustion of remedies. In Ferry the

court found that a civilian Air Force employee had failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies when he filed his complaint before the
wrong reviewing board.6 7 Appellant maintained that the government
should be equitably estopped from raising the exhaustion of administrative remedies defense because the government had provided him with erroneous information concerning how his claim should be appealed before
the Merit Systems Protection Board." While not expressly addressing the
question of whether equitable estoppel could be asserted against the federal government, the court held that appellant would not be prejudiced
by an assertion of the defense because there were no time limits for filing
a complaint with the appropriate reviewing body and thus appellant
could begin the action anew before the proper board without prejudice. e9
Mullen-Cofee involved deportation proceedings under the Immigration
and Nationality Act.7 0 In this instance, appellant had an arguable defense

to the deportation proceedings brought against him based upon a calculation of time spent in the United States. However, appellant failed to present this issue before the Board of Immigration Appeals and therefore the
71
Eleventh Circuit refused to consider the claim.

62.
63.

976 F,2d at 1382.
Id. at 1385.

64. 954 F.2d 658 (11th Cir. 1992).
65. 976 F.2d 1375 (11th Cir. 1992).
66. 954 F.2d 705 (11th Cir. 1992).
67. Plaintiff filed his action with the Merit Systems Protection Board and court found
that the appropriate reviewing panel was the Office of Special Counsel. 954 F.2d at 660.
68. Id. at 661.
69. Id. at 661-62.
70.

8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1988).

71.

976 F.2d at 1379-80.
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In Kobleur the court faced a unique situation involving exhaustion
under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act." Appellant was a retired employee of the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
and suffered from Alzheimer's disease. 7" Appellant was covered by a private health insurance plan offered by the United States Office of Personas authorized by the Federal Employees Health
nel and Management
74
Benefits Act.

The district court dismissed the case because appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.7 On appeal, appellant contended that
the district court erred in concluding that the Federal Employees Health
Benefits Act required exhaustion of remedies, and contended that the Office of Personnel Management was, in effect, creating an exhaustion requirement.76 However, the Eleventh Circuit deferred to the Agency's interpretation not only of the statute but of its own regulations and found
both to be reasonable. 77 The Eleventh Circuit went on to review the exhaustion issue from a discretionary standard relying upon the doctrine
that the court has such discretion when exhaustion is created by agency
regulation rather than by statute.7 The court found that requiring exhaustion in this case was appropriate and that there were no exceptions
to that doctrine which applied to appellant's case."

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
1989).
79.

5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8914.
954 F.2d at 707.
Id.
Id. at 708.
Id. at 708-10.
Id. at 711.
Id. See also Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Nelson, 872 F.2d 1555, 1561 (11th Cir.
954 F.2d at 711-13.

